•Forecasts on October 29th at 6 pm called for: –Additional rainfall of another ¼ - ¾” –Winds through midnight will be sustained at 30-45 mph
with gusts of 45-65 mph –Overnight winds will be sustained at 15-30 mph with
gusts of 30-50 mph –Storm surge will be 3-6’ and
will peak around midnight. Storm surge should recede by mid morning
•10月29日6：:0预测为: –额外降雨1/4-3/4英寸
–午夜风速将持续在30-45英里/小时、阵风45-65英里/小时
–整夜风速将持续在15-30英里/小时、阵风30-50英里/小时
–风暴潮将达到3-6'，午夜将达到顶峰。上午风暴潮将减弱
P2:Forecast vs. Actual 第二页：预测和实际
•Actual weather from landfall at 8 pm through the early morning –Rainfall was consistent with forecast –Winds through the evening were 40-60 mph with gusts
upon landfall of up to 90 mph –Winds were sustained through the night precluding
storm restoration to begin until 7 am –Storm surge ranged from 11-13.6’, causing widespread flooding and devastation to the region
•从8:00登陆起早间实际天气: –降雨与预测一致
–整夜风速持续为40-60英里/小时、登陆时高达90英里/小时
–风持续了整夜直至7:00开始风暴恢复
–风暴潮达到11-13.6'，导致洪灾泛滥。
P3：PSEG Nuclear Unit Status 第三页：PSEG公司核电站状态
•Hope Creek - 100% Rated Thermal Power •Salem Unit 1- 100% Rated Thermal Power •Salem Unit 2 (two days prior to Sandy’s arrival): –Defueled, Full Core offload, in Spent Fuel Pool –Defueled Mid Loop –Single Source of Off-site power –Major Equipment OOS •2B Emergency Diesel Generator, 2B Vital Bus OOS •2B 125V DC batteries •21 SW Nuclear Header
P5：Salem and Hope Creek Shutdown Criteria 第五页：Salem和Hope Creek核电站关停标准
•IF AT ANY TIME the river level is >98.5 ft, THEN INITIATE actions
to place the Unit in Mode 3 within 6 hours and in Mode 5 within the next 30
hours. •IF hurricane force winds are imminent, THEN INITIATE
preparations such that the Unit is in Hot Standby (Mode 3) at least two hours
prior to the projected arrival of hurricane force winds.
P6：Salem and Hope Creek Emergency Action
Levels (EALs) 第六页：Salem和Hope Creek核电站应急等级（EALs）
•Unusual Event (UE) –Delaware River level reaches 99.5 feet at Salem units,
99.5 feet at Hope Creek –Average Wind Speed >95 mph for any elevation •Alert – Escalation with UE
conditions –Visible damage to Safety Related Structures
P7：Implementation of Severe Weather
Guidelines – Phase 1 (T-3) 第七页：极端天气导则的执行——第一阶段（T-3）
•Operations –Inspect station blackout equipment –Verify remote shutdown panel communications –Indication and switch alignment –Hope Creek blockhouse sump pump staged
•运行 –检查电站停电设备
–检查遥控停机面板通讯
–指示灯和开关之列
–Hope Creek潜水泵准备好
P8：Implementation of Severe Weather
Guidelines – Phase 1 (T-3) 第八页：极端天气导则的执行——第一阶段（T-3）
•Maintenance –Protect spare equipment required for recovery –Inspect/remove/secure outside areas for potential
missiles –Staging of sump pumps and sandbags –Availability of emergency supplies like flashlights,
potable water, etc.
•维修 –准备好用于恢复的背影设备
–检查/去除/加固室外区域潜在危险
–准备好潜水泵和沙包
–有效应急用品如防爆灯、饮用水等。
P9：Implementation of Severe Weather
Guidelines - Phase 2 (T-2)
第九页：极端天气导则的执行——第二阶段（T-2）
•Site walkdowns •Verifying water tight doors •Emergency diesel generator availability •Return Major Plant Equipment for Shutdown Safety •Ensuring water intakes prepared for severe weather •Address potential staffing requirement
•厂址巡查 •检查水闭门
•应急柴油机有效
•使得主要电厂设备安全停运
•确保用以极端天气准备的取水
•员工潜在需求的服装
P10：Staffing requirements 第十页：员工需求
Only essential personnel req’d to report –Specific responders from two ERO teams –Operations Support Center (OSCs) –Technical Support Center (TSC) –Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
仅仅是需要报告的重要专业人员
–2个ERO（应急响应团队）专门反馈
–运营支持中心（OSCs）
–技术支持中心（TSC）
–应急操作设备（EOF）
P11：Implementation of Severe Weather
Guidelines - Phase 3 (T-0)
第十一页：极端天气导则的执行——第三阶段（T-0）
–Close watertight doors –Relocate personnel –Implement preplanned sandbagging –Relocate vehicles to shelter –Establish Fire Protection command post
–Complete various Service Water Bay penetration repairs
–关闭水闭门
–安置人员
–执行事前计划的垒沙袋工作
–重新安置汽车以防护
–建立消防指挥部
–完成各种防渗水修复工作
P12：Superstorm Sandy impacts 第十二页：超强风暴桑迪的影响
•Hope Creek - Remained at 100%, HC output greater than demand on PJM •Salem Unit 1 manually taken offline at 1:09 am (5 day
forced outage) –Four of the six circulating water pumps no longer
available –Heavy debris, waves resulted in Travelling water
screens stopping •Non-vital Switching Station lost due to water
intrusion –Loss of power to several buildings onsite –Lost onsite intranet, phones, met tower data to Salem
control rooms
第十三页：员工需求 •Suspended Salem Unit 2 refueling
outage activities on Sunday evening, October 28 –All equipment, except SW header, returned to
Operations –Reactor Cavity flooded up to Refueling level for defense
in depth –All contractors left site that weekend –First time in operating history to suspended refueling
outage
•10月28日、星期六晚上，推迟Salem#2机组的换料大修
–所用设备，除了SW顶盖，重返运行；
–反应堆堆腔注水至换料水位用以纵深防御
–所用员工周末留在现场
–运行史上首次推迟换料大修
P14：Superstorm Sandy Lessons Learned
第十四页：超级风暴桑迪的经验教训 •Equipment Issues / Storm
Preparations –Substation enclosures are susceptible to water
intrusion –Lack of outage contingencies for loss of building
capabilities –Lack of adequate sleeping arrangements for essential
personnel. –Access road monitoring and shoring – extra fill / seawall
•设备问题/风暴准备
–开关站围墙易遭受水侵袭
–缺乏建筑物失电后的维修应变措施
–重要人员缺少额外睡眠的安排
–进城道路监护和支护——额外的填充/防波堤
P15：Lessons Learned – Root Cause
第十五页：经验教训——根本原因 •Abnormal Procedure Guidance –Inadequate severe weather guidance in Abnormal
procedure for wind speed, direction, grassing levels, tide, etc. –Decision Making on unit power did not account for wave
action effects –Severe Weather Guide – No
single designated information source for decision-making
•Previous Shutdown Criteria –IF AT ANY TIME river level is >98.5 ft… •Maximum Tide was 97.2 feet –IF hurricane force winds are imminent... •Maximum average wind speed was 59 miles per hour •Wind direction shifted 180° in
four hours directed at CWIS
•New Shutdown Criteria –CW intake degradation index •Uses grassing, tide, wind speed and direction •Guidance to shutdown as a composite –If hurricane is to pass within 50 miles of site -
shutdown
